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Internalizing International Trade Law: A Critical Analysis of the Canadian Free
Trade Agreement’s National Treatment Jurisprudence
Abstract
The Canadian Free Trade Agreement 2017 (CFTA), which replaced the Agreement on Internal Trade 1995
(AIT), provides a forum to resolve internal trade disputes against provinces, territories, and the federal
government. Under its predecessor, the AIT, thirteen dispute panels and two appeal panels convened to
adjudicate such claims; to date, no cases have yet been brought under the CFTA. Despite its lengthy
lifespan and repeated use, little literature exists that critically examines the substantive findings and
analytical methods found in the AIT’s jurisprudence (case law now inherited by the CFTA). Academic
dialogue on the legal reasoning found within the body of rulings of Canada’s unique dispute forum can
offer future CFTA adjudicators insights so as to improve the coherence, clarity, and consistency of their
decisions. This article focuses, in particular, on the state of CFTA jurisprudence on the national treatment
obligation, which is analogous to article III of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). By investigating the trajectory of CFTA case law on the national treatment
obligation, while interweaving insights from WTO jurisprudence, this article is able to identify the current
state of doctrine, as well as continued shortcomings and uncertainties. In addition, this method of
research can identify possible insights from WTO jurisprudence to fill analytical gaps. Especially in light of
the Supreme Court of Canada’s firm 2018 pronouncement in R v Comeau, which essentially shuttered
court doors to domestic trade disputes, this research is of particular relevance as CFTA dispute panels
going forward will only take on a heightened significance as a means to address internal barriers to trade.
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OVER THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR lifespan of the nation’s internal trade agreement

regime, litigants have sought resolution to internal trade conficts from the
profered adjudicatory process ffteen times.1 In each of these cases, ad hoc panels
or appeal panels were convened to interpret and analyze the Agreement on Internal
Trade 1995 (AIT) obligations in the context of the dispute at hand. Te reports
issued by the dispute resolution bodies at the conclusion of the adjudicatory
proceedings provide disputing parties the reasoning for the decisions. However,
perhaps more consequentially, this collection of ffteen decisions issued by
adjudicatory panels serves as the accumulated jurisprudence of the AIT (which
was then inherited by the CFTA upon its replacement of the AIT in 2017).
Tis set of case law provides meaningful guidance to Canadian governments and
private parties as it clarifes the contours of the obligations providing for free
trade within Canada.
In the years since its creation, almost no secondary literature has been
published that examines the reasoning and analysis found within the amassed
CFTA jurisprudence. In seeking to initiate a scholarly dialogue on the content
1.

Canadian Free Trade Agreement–Consolidated Version, 24 April 2020, art 201(1), online
(pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
CFTA-Consolidated-Text-Final-English_April-24-2020.pdf> [perma.cc/
HXB2-CU25] [CFTA].
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of internal trade dispute reports, this article explores in detail the trajectory of
CFTA case law on one underpinning obligation in particular, found at article
201(1) of the CFTA: national treatment.2 Tis article examines in detail seven
key cases that have propelled the state of the CFTA’s national treatment doctrine
to where it stands today.
Before assessing the progression of panel and appellate panel interpretations
of the national treatment obligation, this article will frst describe the origins of
the CFTA and build the case for robust scholarly literature in this domain.3

I. IMPETUS FOR AN INTERNAL TRADE AGREEMENT
At section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the drafters of Canada’s foundational
document included a provision that, read literally, should have created a nation
where unfettered internal free trade prevailed. Te text of the section provides
that “[a]ll Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the
Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other
provinces.”4 Tough the text of section 121 might have suggested that Canada
would grow up to become a tightly integrated economic unit, by the time the
CFTA came into existence in 1995, this had not become the case. In the 1980s,
at a time when nations were liberalizing trade with one another, a number of
scholars attempted to calculate the economic cost of internal barriers to trade.
In 1983, John Whalley estimated that existing barriers to the fow of goods cost
Canada one-half of one per cent of Canadian GNP each year (590 million CAD
in today’s dollars).5 Later, in 1991, Todd Rutley estimated economy-wide efects
on all trade fows, not just on those of goods, of 6.5 billion CAD per year.6 Te
story of the CFTA’s origin stems from this disconnect between theorized national

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ibid.
Where the standalone word “agreement” is used in this article, it refers to the CFTA.
References to the AIT will be made explicit.
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 121.
John Whalley, “Induced Distortions of Interprovincial Activity: An Overview of Issues”
in Michael Trebilcock et al, eds, Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (Ontario
Economic Council, 1983) 161 at 190-92.
Kathleen Macmillan & Patrick Grady, “Inter-Provincial Barriers to Internal Trade in Goods,
Services and Flows of Capital: Policy, Knowledge Gaps and Research Issues” (2007) Industry
Canada Working Paper No 2007-11, citing Todd Rutley, “‘Canada 1993’: A Plan for the
Creation of a Single Economic Market in Canada,” (Canadian Manufacturers’ Association,
1991) at 3, online (pdf ): <www.mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8709/1/MPRA_paper_8709.
pdf> [perma.cc/HEN2-D4VE].
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economic unity as manifested in the Constitution and the economic reality that
empirical economics could quantify.
Internal barriers to trade can largely be explained by the Supreme Court
of Canada’s delicate navigation of the division of power between the federal
government, the provinces, and the territories, in its narrow construction of
section 121’s meaning. In narrowly interpreting its implication, the Court has
sought to preserve the ability of provinces to regulate trade, even at the expense
of national economic integration. Jurisprudence stemming as far back as Gold
Seal Ltd v Dominion Express Co in 1921 severely circumscribes the power of
section 121. Te most recent articulation of its narrow scope comes from the
9–0 decision of R v Comeau which ruled that for a law to violate section 121,
it must “in essence [restrict] trade across a provincial border.”7 A litigant may
use section 121 to fght a tarif or its functional equivalent, but not much else.
Without further guidance from the legislative branch of government, the Court
is highly unlikely to deviate from its nearly one-hundred-year understanding
of the provision.
Tis state of afairs stands in marked contrast with that which has come
to exist in the United States. Over the course of nearly two-hundred years,
dating back to Gibbons v Ogden in 1824, the United States Supreme Court has
cultivated and employed a doctrine known as the Dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC).8 Sourcing to the US federal government’s authority over commerce in
article I of the US Constitution, the DCC’s underlying principle is that state and
local laws are unconstitutional should they unduly burden interstate commerce.9
Even in the absence of US federal law, the US Court deploys the doctrine to deny
protectionist rule making of the states.
With the unavailability of an analogous judicial remedy to strike down those
protectionist laws and regulations erected by Canadian governments that impede
on the fow of goods, services, people, and investments, the Canadian polity
came together and negotiated a political agreement that might serve almost
the same purpose.

7.
8.
9.

Gold Seal Ltd v Alberta (AG) (1921), 62 SCR 424; R v Comeau, 2018 SCC 15 at para 8.
Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
US Const, art I, § 8, cl 3. See generally Donald H Regan, “Te Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause” (1986) 84
Mich L Rev 1091.
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II. THE CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
As a result of the judicial impasse before the Court, as well as the failure of
constitutional amendment at the Charlottetown Accords which may have
otherwise strengthened constitutional free trade structures, the provinces, the
territories, and the federal government came together in the spirit of cooperative
federalism and crafted a political solution.10 Initially termed the Agreement on
Internal Trade (AIT) at its genesis in 1995, but renamed the Canadian Free Trade
Agreement at its re-negotiation in 2017, the CFTA imposes an additional set of
internal trade rules on Canadian governments.11 Tese rules do not carry the force
of law, nor do they displace constitutional obligations.12 Rather, they are simply
a set of rules that each party to the agreement has agreed to comply with. Parties
can exit the agreement with relative ease after providing the other parties twelve
months’ notice, and the penalties for non-compliance—in practice—have been
de minimis (though the text of the Agreement does technically allow for penalties
of up to ten million dollars in certain circumstances).13 In a contemporary
context, the CFTA obligations provide a norm for government actors to follow,
rather than a binding rule.
Owing to the era of rapid globalization in which it was conceived, the
obligations found within the agreement fnd frm parallels with provisions in the
CFTA’s international counterparts, such as the General Agreement on Tarifs and
10. See Katherine Swinton, “Courting Our Way to Economic Integration: Judicial Review and
the Canadian Economic Union” (1995) 25 Can Bus LJ 280 at 281, 288; Noemi Gal-Or, “In
Search of Unity in Separateness: Interprovincial Trade, Territory, and Canadian Federalism”
(1998) 9 NJCL 307 at 313.
11. CFTA, supra note 1; Agreement on Internal Trade–Consolidated Version, 18 January 2000,
online (pdf ): <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Consolidated-with-14thProtocol-fnal-draft.pdf> [perma.cc/6J7S-7H3F] [AIT]. Tis article acknowledges that the
CFTA is a re-negotiated form of the AIT. However, as will be justifed later in the article,
the content of the two agreements is substantially similar, and thus for ease of reference,
this article uses the short form CFTA to refer to both the CFTA as well as the period
when it was called the AIT. It specifes the AIT only where it is necessary to distinguish
it from the CFTA.
12. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1200.
13. See CFTA, supra note 1, art 1214. See also ibid, Annex 1011.2, 1028.2. To date, the
greatest monetary award made publicly available was for 31,191 CAD. See Report of
the Article 1716 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between the Certifed General Accountants
Association of New Brunswick and Québec Regarding Québec’s Measures Governing the Practice
of Public Accounting (19 August 2005) at 24, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat
<www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/1_eng.pdf>
[perma.cc/D9V4-UYUL].

432

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994 (NAFTA).14
For example, article 201(2) of the CFTA serves as a national treatment provision
for investments;15 a similar provision is found at article 1102 of the NAFTA.16
Another instance of parallelism is in respect of the most favoured nation
obligation imposed on the federal government at article 201(3) of the CFTA, and
an analogous most favoured nation obligation found at article I of the GATT.17
Not only does the CFTA impose trade obligations akin to those found between
sovereign nations, but it also provides for a dispute settlement mechanism similar
to those provided by bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements.
Parties to the CFTA, and even private individuals, may initiate proceedings
that ultimately lead to the creation of an ad hoc dispute panel to decide on a
trade obstacle.18 Tis is similar to that which the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) Dispute Settlement Body ofers for trade disputes under the GATT,
or that which the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) framework provides to adjudicate an investment dispute under an
applicable bilateral investment treaty.19 Te current version of the NAFTA also
provides an arbitration process for investment disputes at chapter eleven, though
this will change following the ratifcation and implementation of its successor
agreement, the Canada–US–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).20 Under the CUSMA,
the investor–state dispute settlement mechanism between the United States and
14. General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 (1994) [GATT]; North American
Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the
Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (entered into force
1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
15. Article 201(2) of the CFTA is the successor to article 401(2)(a) of the AIT; CFTA, supra note
1, art 201(2); AIT, supra note 11, art 401(2)(a).
16. NAFTA, supra note 14, art 1102.
17. CFTA Article 201(3) is the successor to AIT Article 401(1)(b). See CFTA, supra note 1,
art 201(3); AIT, supra note 11, art 401(1)(b). A most favoured nation (MFN) obligation
requires a party to accord no less favourable treatment to another party’s goods than the
treatment it ofers a third party’s goods.
18. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 1004, 1018.
19. See Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [DSU];
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID]) 575 UNTS 159.
20. NAFTA, supra note 14, c 11. See also Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement
(CUSMA), 30 November 2018, online: Government of Canada <www.international.gc.ca/
trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum> [perma.cc/
U4WP-MDEJ] [CUSMA] (entry into force expected 2020).
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Canada will discontinue three years after the termination of NAFTA.21 Disputes
between Canada and Mexico will be governed by the mechanism found in the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacifc Partnership (CPTPP).22
Notwithstanding this particular development in respect of NAFTA, at its core,
the CFTA mimics the international trade and investment law framework and
applies an analogous model to the domestic context of Canada.
One novel feature of the CFTA regime that may herald a schism between the
systems of internal trade and international trade arose when the CFTA replaced
the AIT in 2017. Canadian governments included a regulatory cooperation and
reconciliation process at chapter four of the CFTA. Tis mechanism emphasizes
inter-governmental regulatory dialogue amongst Canadian governments to
resolve divergent policies that impair trade.23 Tis process that the CFTA provides
for also encourages the nationwide adoption of common measures.24 In contrast,
the primary emphasis of international structures, such as the GATT, is the
mutual recognition of divergent regulation.25 Over time, the CFTA reconciliation
mechanism may serve as the primary means for trade barrier resolution, rather
than recourse to litigation. Ultimately, this may erode the analogy between the
CFTA and international trade dispute resolution mechanisms.
A.

LACK OF SECONDARY LITERATURE EXAMINING CFTA
JURISPRUDENCE

In the course of the AIT’s lifetime26 there were ffteen occasions when complainants
triggered the dispute resolution mechanism to convene a panel or appeal panel
(together, “presiding body”) that then ultimately released a report. Tese reports
provide a presiding body’s reasoning behind its decisions. CFTA reports are
not binding on future cases (this was also true under the AIT). At article 1208,
the CFTA provides that a presiding body “may take into account any relevant
interpretations and fndings” contained in the report of a previous presiding
21. Ibid, Annex 14-C.
22. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacifc Partnership, 18 March 2018, ATS
23 (entered into force 20 December 2018).
23. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 400-408.
24. Ibid.
25. See generally Anabela Correia de Brito, Céline Kaufmann & Jacques Pelkmans,
“Te Contribution of Mutual Recognition to International Regulatory
Co-Operation” (2016) OECD Regulatory Policy Working Paper No 2, online: <doi.
org/10.1787/5jm56fqsfxmx-en>.
26. Tis period is inclusive of the time when the CFTA existed as its predecessor
agreement, the AIT.

434

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

body established under the AIT or the CFTA.27 At most, they may be seen as a
persuasive authority. Nonetheless, later-in-time presiding bodies convened under
the AIT routinely cited the reasoning and doctrine developed in previous AIT
dispute reports for authority on an approach to a legal issue. Over the span of
the ffteen reports issued by AIT presiding bodies, adjudicators have built upon
and refned their interpretations of internal trade obligations in order to manage
disputes over domestic trade barriers. Tis jurisprudence remains relevant for
disputes under the CFTA.
Despite repeated use of the internal trade regime’s dispute resolution
mechanism, there exists little scholarly literature that critically assesses the
jurisprudence, developing practices, and emergent doctrines that have inculcated
thus far over the lifespan of the AIT/CFTA. Secondary scholarship plays an
important role in refning the reasoning and methodology of any judicial system,
and the lack of dialogue on CFTA adjudicatory outcomes hinders its efcacy and
legitimacy. An uncertain state of CFTA jurisprudence can create two problems.
First, it makes it difcult for government policy makers to craft CFTA-compliant
measures. Second, it limits the ability of prospective litigants to assess their rights
and entitlements under the CFTA in order to make an informed decision on
whether to launch a CFTA complaint.
Te focus of this article is on the national treatment obligation found
at CFTA article 201(1).28 Tough this provision has experienced repeated
interpretation by an overwhelming majority of dispute panels that have convened
under the AIT, there exists no secondary literature that examines presiding body
decisions on this issue in depth. Tis article explores the development of the
jurisprudence on the CFTA’s national treatment provision, while interweaving
insights from GATT case law on its analogous national treatment provision at
article III. In doing so, this article will identify not only the state of the law, but
also the sources of continued uncertainty. Drawing on WTO jurisprudence, this
article ofers insights that may help fll analytical gaps.
Te need for robust discussion about the reasoning found within the AIT
panel and appeal panel reports is particularly strong in light of the fact that all
CFTA presiding bodies (as did those under the AIT) convene on an ad hoc
basis. Tere is no standing adjudicatory body that helps build institutional
knowledge; instead, in every case, complainant and respondent parties nominate
one adjudicator each to serve on the presiding body, and these two nominated
27. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1208 [emphasis added].
28. Te national treatment obligation under the AIT was at article 401, while its general
exceptions clause was at article 404. See AIT, supra note 11, arts 401, 404.
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individuals decide between themselves on a third adjudicator.29 Tough one-third
of AIT panelists have occupied over sixty per cent of all adjudicatory roles,
very few have participated in the adjudication of more than two internal trade
disputes.30 Tus, unlike in the domestic judicial context where judges who are
appointed for lengthy tenures can build a knowledge-base and amass experience
deciding disputes, most CFTA panelists will have never participated in a CFTA
dispute, and are unlikely to participate in another.31 At the WTO, though panels
are convened in a similar ad hoc fashion, there exists an Appellate Body that
hears appeals from panel decisions, and whose members are elected for terms of
up to eight years.32
Te diferences between a standing and ad hoc adjudicatory body are
meaningful, and they underscore the need for academic scholarship focused
on CFTA jurisprudence. A potential frst-order distinction is in respect of
impartiality, or perceived impartiality, as between panelists appointed by the
parties to the dispute and panelists appointed by an external process for a fxed
term. Evidence on this issue comes from the international context. Research by
Albert Jan Van Den Berg suggests that arbitrators are infuenced by the party
that appointed them.33 In the feld of investment arbitration, nearly all dissents
have been written by the arbitrator appointed by the losing party.34 In the case
of Canadian internal trade dispute adjudication, out of the ffteen published
reports, only three of them saw dissenting opinions, though it is impossible to
determine if they were written by the arbitrator appointed by the losing side.
To help overcome actual or perceived bias, robust secondary literature must
engage with the substantive reasoning found within the reports of presiding
bodies and ofer its own critical assessment.
Another important diference between these two forms of adjudicatory
bodies that furthers the need for secondary literature is the relative diference
in subject-matter fuency and procedural familiarity that members to a standing
body gain relative to those members of an ad hoc adjudicatory body. With these
29. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 1005, 1019.
30. Ryan Manucha, “Arbitrator Bias and Domestic Trade Disputes” (18 February 2019),
online: Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/arbitrator-bias-anddomestic-trade-disputes/275873> [perma.cc/3F77-XBEX] [Manucha, “Arbitrator Bias”].
31. Ibid.
32. DSU, supra note 19, art 17.
33. Albert Jan van den Berg, “Dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators in investment
arbitration,” in Mahnoush H Arsanjani et al, eds, Looking to the Future: Essays on
International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhof, 2011) 821 at 824.
34. Ibid.
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two relative strengths, standing bodies such as the WTO’s Appellate Body may
be better able to create “workable jurisprudence” for interpreting legal texts.35
Te set of interpretations that a fxed, institutionalized structure generates could
arguably improve an ad hoc system’s coherence and predictability.36 However,
given that the current CFTA model does not have an analogous standing appellate
body, it is even more incumbent upon the academic community to cultivate legal
academic literature that critically assesses the jurisprudence, so that future ad hoc
bodies may have some guidance as they conduct their adjudicatory duties.

III. THE NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE
Te fundamental objective of a national treatment provision is to prevent a party
from treating foreign products less favorably than equivalent domestic products.
Te existence of this type of non-discrimination clause dates back to at least
as early as the twelfth or thirteenth century.37 Tere can be both explicit and
implicit discrimination. An example of the former is a rule which says that, for
example, all foreign-produced widgets may only be sold between midnight and
fve o’clock in the morning, while domestically produced widgets may be sold
at any point in the day. Initially at the WTO, breaches of national treatment
obligations were found only in cases of explicit discrimination, otherwise known
as de jure discrimination.38 However, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO
has increasingly addressed a far more subtle violation of the national treatment
principle—implicit discriminatory measures.39
Implicit discrimination—otherwise known as de facto discrimination—
comes from measures whose text does not necessarily suggest that foreign
products are treated any less favourably than domestic “like” products, but in

35. Anna Joubin-Bret, “Why We Need a Global Appellate Mechanism for International
Investment Law” (27 April 2015), online (pdf ): Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment <www.ccsi.columbia.edu/fles/2013/10/No-146-Joubin-Bret-FINAL.pdf>
[perma.cc/AC7R-EBTS].
36. See Karl P Sauvant, “Te International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Challenges
and Options” (2015) at 11, online (pdf ): International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development and the World Economic Forum <e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
E15-Investment-Sauvant-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/6FRN-L2H6].
37. See Pieter VerLoren van Temaat, Te Changing Structure of International Economic Law
(Martinus Nijhof, 1981) at 16-21.
38. Ion Gâlea & Bogdan Biriş, “National Treatment in International Trade and Investment Law”
(2014) 44 Acta Juridica Hungarica 174 at 177.
39. Ibid.
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practice, they are.40 For example, suppose Country X imposes a law that requires
that the sale of beer with an alcohol-by-volume (ABV) in excess of 6 per cent
be subject to a 100 per cent surcharge. However, Country X’s brewers solely
produce beer with an ABV below 6 per cent; all beer with an ABV in excess of
6 per cent comes from foreign producers. In this case, even though the measure
does not explicitly distinguish the imported from the domestic goods, the efect
of the measure is to treat imported beer less favourably than domestic beer.
B. ARTICLE III OF THE GATT

Before exploring the national treatment provision found within the CFTA,
a cursory examination of the analogous provision in the GATT will help ground
the discussion. It is worth noting that the GATT, and WTO jurisprudence in
general, are authoritative sources in the context of the CFTA. Tere are three
arguments in support of this proposition. First, CFTA article 1208(2)(b)
explicitly allows CFTA presiding bodies to look to WTO law as a means to
interpret provisions of the CFTA.41 Second, an emergent practice in CFTA case
law is to draw on available insight from WTO law and jurisprudence to aid in
the interpretation and analysis of CFTA obligations.42 Finally, as this article will
demonstrate in the case of the national treatment provision, much of the language
found within the CFTA is identical to that which is found in the GATT, 1994,
and WTO jurisprudence in general. It is justifable for, if not incumbent upon,
CFTA panelists to look to the well-developed body of law that has developed at
the WTO over the course of its nearly four hundred published rulings.
Tere may be instances where interpretations of the CFTA justifably
depart from those of the GATT. Justifcation for this comes primarily from
discernible intent in the text of the CFTA. Drafters of the CFTA made the
explicit requirement that adjudicators sitting on frst-instance CFTA panels have
40. John H Jackson, “National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tarif Barriers” (1989) 10 Mich
J Intl L 207 at 213.
41. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1208(2)(b).
42. See e.g. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta/British
Columbia and Ontario Regarding Ontario’s Measures Governing Dairy Analogs and
Dairy Blends (10 November 2004) at 18, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.
cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/3_eng.pdf> [perma.
cc/Y3VM-FKQ3] [Ontario–Dairy (I)]; Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the
Dispute Between Alberta and Québec Regarding Québec’s Measure Governing the Sale
in Québec of Coloured Margarine (23 June 2005) at 9-10, online (pdf ): Internal Trade
Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/2_
eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TYF5-4BMP] [Québec–Margarine].
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“expertise or experience in matters covered by this Agreement.”43 As the CFTA
is a domesticated version of an international trade agreement, the implication of
this requirement is that panel members must have familiarity with international
trade law. In contrast, CFTA appellate panel members must have “experience in
Canadian administrative law or the resolution of disputes arising under Canadian
administrative law.”44 Rather than install international trade law experts on the
appellate panel, the CFTA opts for Canadian administrative law experts. To give
meaning to this explicit distinction, it must be the case that drafters intended for
tenets of Canadian administrative law to circumscribe or modify the application
of international trade law in internal trade disputes. Drafters could easily have
required international trade law expertise of appellate panel members. Tus,
it may be proper for a CFTA presiding body to depart from GATT jurisprudence.
Departure from extant GATT jurisprudence may also be necessary in light
of contemporary political circumstances. At the time of this article’s publication,
there is no standing Appellate Body at the WTO. As a result of political impasse,
no new nominations for Appellate Body members have succeeded, and the
Appellate Body cannot achieve quorum sufcient to preside over new cases.
Tis existential crisis for the WTO’s Appellate Body may afect CFTA presiding
bodies insofar as no new jurisprudential developments by the Appellate Body will
be forthcoming until the impasse is resolved.
Te GATT national treatment provision is at article III.45 It serves to
prohibit laws that facilitate hidden protectionism, as well as those measures that
are functionally equivalent to a tarif barrier.46 Within article III are two diferent
streams of national treatment analysis—one for tax regulations at article III:2,
and the other for non-tax measures at article III:4.47 Broadly speaking, both
of these two streams undertake the same two-step analysis. First, the inquiry
is to determine whether the imported and domestic goods are “like.” However,
article III:2’s inquiry is broader than that of article III:4, as the former provision
asks whether the two goods are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”48
However, for both, the basic inquiry for the “like products” analysis is the same.

43.
44.
45.
46.

CFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1005.2(3)(a).
Ibid, Annex 1005.2(10)(a).
GATT, supra note 14, art III.
Peter M Gerhart & Michael S Baron, “Understanding National Treatment: Te Participatory
Vision of the WTO” (2004) 14 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 505 at 505-506.
47. Ibid at 530.
48. GATT, supra note 14, art III:2. See also Gerhart & Baron, supra note 46 at 530.
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It amounts to a determination as to whether the domestic and imported products
are in a competitive relationship with one another.49
Te second step in the GATT’s national treatment analysis is to determine
whether less favorable treatment has been accorded to the imported good. Te
adjudicator will seek to determine whether a WTO member has “modifed the
conditions of competition in the market place to the detriment of imported
products vis-à-vis like domestic products.”50 As discussed earlier, the discrimination
can come in the form of an explicit or implicit measure implemented by a
party to the GATT.
Having explored the WTO framework for analyzing an alleged violation
of the GATT national treatment provision, this article can more efectively
understand the CFTA’s analogous provision, along with the trajectory of
domestic jurisprudence.
C. ARTICLE 201(1) OF THE CFTA

Canada’s domestic trade agreement maintains a national treatment provision
for goods at article 201(1). Embedded within the text of article 201(1) is a
most favoured nation (MFN) obligation in addition to the national treatment
obligation; however, a full analysis of the MFN component to 201(1) is outside
the scope of this article. Terefore, it will only be discussed to the extent that it
provides the basis of subsequent panel interpretation of the national treatment
obligation. CFTA article 201 reads:51
Non-Discrimination
1. Each Party shall accord to goods of any other Party treatment no less favourable
than the best treatment it accords to its own like, directly competitive or substitutable
goods and to those of any other Party or non-Party.

Te text of article 201(1) is equivalent, though not identical, to its predecessor
found in the AIT at article 401(1). As can be seen below, the only diference is

49. Border Tax Adjustments; Japan–Alcohol; Gerhart & Baron, supra note 46 at 530-31.
50. Ming Du, “‘Treatment No Less Favorable’ and the Future of National Treatment Obligation
in GATT Article III:4 after EC–Seal Products” (2016) 15 World Trade Rev 129 at 142
(examining the Korea–Measures Afecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef Appellate
Body report); WTO, Korea–Measures Afecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
(2000), WTO Doc WT/DS161/AB/R at para 137 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm> [perma.cc/A37J-5X6G].
51. CFTA, supra note 1, art 201.
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that article 401(1) subdivides into the national treatment obligation at 401(1)(a)
and the MFN obligation at 401(1)(b). AIT article 401 reads:52
Reciprocal non-Discrimination
1. Subject to Article 404, each Party shall accord to goods of any other Party
treatment no less favourable than the best treatment it accords to:
(a) its own like, directly competitive or substitutable goods; and
(b) like, directly competitive or substitutable goods of any other Party or non-Party.

As a result of the textual similarities, this article’s conclusions and analysis of
dispute reports produced under the predecessor AIT in respect of article 401(1)
(a) are applicable to article 201(1) of the CFTA.
1.

COMPARISON WITH THE TEXT OF GATT ARTICLE III

A preliminary textual comparison between the CFTA and GATT shows that the
national treatment provision of CFTA imports the standard of GATT article
III:2, rather than article III:4, when comparing imported and domestic products
under the frst part of the national treatment analysis. At 201(1), a party is not
to accord less favourable treatment to the goods of another party that are “like,
directly competitive or substitutable.”53 Tis standard of comparison is identical
to that found at GATT article III:2. In contrast, as discussed above, article
III:4 of the GATT merely asks if the products are “like” and does not include
the “directly competitive or substitutable” language of article III:2. Te panel
in Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages clarifed that “like products” are a subset
of “directly competitive and substitutable” products.54 As such, the article III:2
“like, directly competitive or substitutable” assessment is broader than the article
III:4 “likeness” assessment.
Given that CFTA article 201(1) imports the language of GATT article III:2,
CFTA panels may more appropriately fnd WTO authority for the imported
versus domestic product comparison pursuant to a national treatment analysis in
the WTO’s jurisprudence for article III:2 rather than article III:4. However, this
is a peculiar result. Article III:2 of the GATT is the national treatment obligation
for measures that are internal taxes or charges, while article III:4 is directed
towards measures that are non-tax regulations. Given that article 802 of the
52. AIT, supra note 11, art 401.
53. CFTA, supra note 1, art 201.
54. Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (1999), WTO Doc WT/DS75/AB/R at para 118
(Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds75_e.htm> [perma.cc/VV9D-MUP3].
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CFTA essentially excludes any measure relating to taxation from falling within
the scope of the agreement, a CFTA panel will never address a national treatment
complaint against a taxation measure.55 Tus, drafters of the CFTA (and the AIT)
opted for the more expansive “like, directly competitive or substitutable” standard
of GATT article III:2, whose jurisprudence is not relevant to any potential CFTA
national treatment case, and eschewed the narrower “like” standard of article
III:4 along with its more relevant jurisprudence.
D. THE TRAJECTORY OF CFTA JURISPRUDENCE ON THE NATIONAL
TREATMENT PROVISION

Te internal trade regime’s national treatment obligation was invoked by
complainants and interpreted by dispute panels on a number of occasions
throughout the AIT’s existence. Tese rulings now inform the identical obligation
found in the CFTA. Tis article will now examine these interpretations and
establish the state of national treatment jurisprudence under the CFTA. However,
in order to understand the trajectory of the national treatment case law, this
article must frst start by examining the interpretation of the AIT/CFTA’s MFN
obligation in Canada—MMT.56
1.

CANADA–MMT

Tough the panel in Canada–MMT introduced the test for a violation of the
federal government’s MFN obligation under the AIT (and now, the CFTA),
later-in-time AIT dispute panels referred to and imported substantially the same
MFN test crafted in Canada–MMT to interpret the AIT’s national treatment
obligation. As such, though there are important diferences between the principles
of MFN and national treatment, the assessment of the CFTA’s national treatment
jurisprudence necessarily starts here.
In this case, the Alberta government submitted that the federal government’s
new law prohibiting the import and interprovincial trade of manganese
tricarbonyl (MMT)—a common additive to gasoline used to increase octane
levels—violated the federal government’s MFN obligation found at article

55. CFTA, supra note 1, art 802. Te AIT had an almost identical provision at article 1805. See
AIT, supra note 11, art 1805.
56. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding
the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act (12 June 1998), online (pdf ): Internal Trade
Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/8_
eng.pdf> [perma.cc/AX6G-K9YG] [Canada–MMT].
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401(3).57 Tis provision of the AIT (which persists in the CFTA) states that the
federal government must accord goods of a province or territory treatment “no
less favourable than the best treatment it accords like, directly competitive or
substitutable goods” of any other province.58
Te panel examined AIT article 401(3) and interpreted it to call for a two-part
test.59 First, the presiding body is to inquire whether there existed discrimination
against the goods of another party.60 Tis discrimination could come as either
“direct” or “indirect” discrimination.61 Direct discrimination is “where goods
from one Party are favoured over identical goods from another Party.”62 Indirect
discrimination is where “goods produced predominantly in the territory of one
Party are favoured over directly competitive or substitutable goods produced
predominantly in the territory of another Party.”63 Second, after establishing one
of the two forms of discrimination, the panel is to determine whether the goods
are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”64
In construing the analysis in this fashion, the AIT panel adopted an approach
that is the reverse of that which is set forth in WTO MFN case law. In the WTO
jurisprudence for the GATT MFN provision provided at article I, in practice it
is only after establishing likeness between the goods of a complainant and a third
party that a WTO panel will determine if a nation accorded better treatment to
the goods of a third party than that extended to the goods of the complaining
party.65 Te WTO’s MFN analysis is more complex than what has been described

57. Ibid at 1-2.
58. AIT, supra note 11, art 401(3). Tis was the predecessor to article 201(3) of the CFTA. See
CFTA, supra note 1, art 201(3).
59. Canada–MMT, supra note 56 at 6-7.
60. Ibid at 7.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. European Communities–Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products
(2014), WTO Doc WT/DS400/AB/R at para 5.99 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm> [perma.cc/779M-5VSU].
In WTO jurisprudence, just as is the case for national treatment allegation analysis,
panels and the Appellate Body always examine “likeness” in the MFN analysis before
determining whether the impugned measure constituted discrimination in violation of
the MFN obligation. GATT MFN discrimination in the sense of article I:1 cannot arise
if the products are not “like,” functionally making it a precondition—as such, a fnding of
likeness precedes any MFN discrimination analysis. See Canada–Certain Measures Afecting
the Automotive Industry (2000), WTO Doc WT/DS139/R at para 6.15 (Appellate Body
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here, but any further expansion is outside the scope of this article which is focused
on the interpretation of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment provision.
Setting aside the panel’s inverted formulation of the MFN test found within
WTO case law, there were a number of weaknesses in the way that the Canada–
MMT panel formulated the MFN test, all of which had direct implications on
subsequent panels’ interpretation of the CFTA’s national treatment obligation.
Te frst has to do with its defnition of “direct discrimination.” Te panel
provided that, in order to constitute direct discrimination, the imported and
domestic goods needed to be “identical.”66 However, this standard of “identical”
does not have any basis in the text of AIT article 401(1)(a) (or its successor,
CFTA article 201(1)). Not only does the standard of “identical” lack textual
authority, but it creates internal incoherence with the second step of the test
outlined by the Canada–MMT presiding body: Tat the goods need to be “like,
directly competitive or substitutable.”67 Is “identical” the same as “like, directly
competitive or substitutable”? Te Canada–MMT panel left the standard of
comparison uncertain in a direct discrimination analysis.
Te second fundamental problem with the Canada–MMT panel’s
formulation of the test was that an inverted version of the WTO’s MFN analysis
inherently renders the second part of the test superfuous. Te defnitions of
“direct” and “indirect” discrimination at the frst stage of the national treatment
analysis, according to the Canada–MMT report, explicitly require a panel to
undertake a comparison of the imported and domestic products. In the case of
direct discrimination, the products must be “identical” in the frst stage of the
analysis; for an instance of indirect discrimination, the products must be “directly
competitive or substitutable” at the frst stage.68 Te second stage of the MFN
analysis, according to the Canada–MMT report, then requires a fnding that the
imported and domestic product are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”69
Ignoring the fact that the Canada–MMT panel uses diferent language to describe
the standards of comparison for the frst and second stage of both an indirect or
direct discrimination assessment, the second stage becomes irrelevant given that
the comparison already took place in the frst stage.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds139_e.htm>
[perma.cc/R6JZ-S5J9].
Canada–MMT, supra note 56 at 7.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Te fnal shortcoming to the Canada–MMT MFN analysis is in the
implementation of its own test that it had created earlier in the same panel
report. Te Canada–MMT panel did not fnd discrimination in the frst stage
of its analysis, so it ruled that it was not required to proceed to the second step
of the MFN analysis and make a determination as to whether MMT-infused
gasoline was “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to MMT-free gasoline.70
Regardless of whether there was discrimination, the panel’s own formulation of
the frst stage of the test, provided at page seven, necessarily required the panel
to have already examined the likeness of the imported and domestic products
to make a frst-stage conclusion.71 Had the panel properly undertaken its own
frst-stage analysis, it should have already had to come to a conclusion as to the
likeness of the products. Tus, the panel either incorrectly applied its own test,
or was disingenuous in refusing to provide its conclusion as to the likeness of
MMT-free and MMT-infused gasoline.
Tough the panel report in Canada–MMT was a landmark issuance as the
frst report produced under the then-new AIT, the strength of its MFN test
was lacking. As will be observed in subsequent cases, because later adjudicatory
panels nearly replicated the MFN test from Canada–MMT for the AIT/CFTA’s
national treatment test, the analytical faults permeated successive fndings of
national treatment obligation violations.
2.

PEI–DAIRY

PEI–Dairy,72 the second panel convened under the AIT, converted the Canada–
MMT panel’s MFN test into a national treatment test. In the text of the opinion,
the panel explicitly noted that it was adopting the “same criteria” for its national
treatment analysis as that which had been used in Canada–MMT’s MFN analysis,
but the panel does not justify why this is appropriate.73 Moreover, by importing the
test from Canada–MMT, the panel imported those same analytical shortcomings
identifed in Part III(C)(1), above, such as the inconsistent likeness standards
and the redundant second-step in a two-part analysis. In addition, as Part III(C)

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island Regarding Amendments to the Dairy Industry Act Regulations (18 Jan
2000), online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/
DisputeResolution/PanelReports/7_eng.pdf> [perma.cc/4CQN-8AXQ] [PEI–Dairy].
73. Ibid at 8.
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(2) will describe below, the panel decision in PEI–Dairy generated its own set
of uncertainties.
Te panel in PEI–Dairy was convened to address the complaint by Nova
Scotia that Prince Edward Island had indirectly discriminated against Nova Scotia
fuid milk.74 In 1997, PEI had revoked all existing licenses for dairy processors
and distributors, and required producers to reapply.75 A Nova Scotia company,
which previously held a licence, was denied a new one upon reapplication.76
As part of its complaint, the Nova Scotia company claimed that “like, directly
competitive or substitutable” Nova Scotia fuid milk was subjected to worse
treatment than that of PEI.77
In its analysis, the panel employed the MFN test from Canada–MMT to the
case of PEI’s alleged national treatment obligation violation.78 Tus, the panel in
PEI–Dairy seemingly collapsed the national treatment and MFN tests under the
AIT into a single test, and the panel did not even announce that it had done so.
Te panel even suggests that the MFN test from Canada– MMT is the applicable
test for all claims under the AIT article 401 (non-discrimination) but neglects
to discuss the fact that the non-discrimination clause subdivides into an MFN
and a national treatment provision.79 As a result, the panel in PEI–Dairy merged
two fundamentally unique concepts in the domain of trade law, and no presiding
body has, as of yet, clarifed or distinguished this decision.
In addition to generating confusion within CFTA jurisprudence by
collapsing the national treatment and MFN concepts, the panel generated
further uncertainty as the national treatment test it employed was an inverted
formulation of its GATT counterpart, just as was the MFN test established by
the panel in Canada–MMT. Whereas the GATT’s national treatment test under
article III:4 frst asks whether the goods are “like”—or in the case of article III:2,
whether the goods are “like, directly competitive or substitutable”—according
to this AIT panel’s formulation of the test, the “like, directly competitive or
substitutable” analysis commences only after a panel establishes discrimination.80
Tis inversion made it difcult for domestic trade dispute panels to accurately
employ WTO jurisprudence to support their analysis of a claim under the AIT.
It was not until the most recent presiding body report, issued pursuant to the
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Ibid at 1-2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 2.
Ibid at 8-9.
Ibid at 8.
Ibid at 8-9.
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appeal case of Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel), that a dispute panel fipped
the order of the AIT/CFTA’s traditional national treatment test so that it aligned
with the WTO’s national treatment test.81
One additional issue in respect of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment
obligation was raised but left uncertain by the panel in PEI–Dairy. Te panel
provided that a claim of indirect discrimination must show a “geographical
component to the discrimination for a measure to be inconsistent” with a
government’s national treatment obligation.82 Te notion of a “geographical
component” was frst mentioned in Canada–MMT but the panel in that case
did not signifcantly develop the concept.83 Tere is no textual authority in
the AIT nor the CFTA that the measure of a province or territory must have a
“geographical component” for it to constitute indirect discrimination. Tough
the panel in PEI–Dairy discusses the concept at greater length than the panel
in Canada–MMT, it does not clarify the nature or substance of the term
“geographical component.” In PEI–Dairy, the panel did not have to discuss the
term “geographical component” as PEI admitted to the panel that “geography
was the fundamental factor” in their withdrawal of certain Nova Scotia dairy
licenses.84 Moreover, the panel wrote that the “geographical component” was
satisfed as a result of the evidence demonstrating that “the only fuid milk imports
allowed were products that did not compete with PEI-produced products.”85 Left
uncertain, however, is both the nature of the “geographical component” as well as
the means to identify it. Te next case, New Brunswick–Dairy, attempts to clarify
the concept but creates other ambiguities in doing so.86

81. Appeal of the Report of the Panel in the Dispute Between Artisan Ales Consulting Inc. and the
Government of Alberta Regarding Mark-Ups on Beer (11 May 2018) at 15, online (pdf ):
Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GOA-vs.-ArtisanAle-appeal-report-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/R29W-GNPY] [Alberta–Beer Mark Ups
(Appeal Panel)].
82. PEI–Dairy, supra note 72 at 8.
83. See Canada–MMT, supra note 56 at 7.
84. PEI–Dairy, supra note 72 at 9.
85. Ibid.
86. Report of the Article 1716 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Farmers Co-operative Dairy
Limited of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Regarding New Brunswick’s Fluid Milk Distribution
Licensing Measures (13 September 2002), online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.
cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/5_eng.pdf> [perma.
cc/SR79-33TQ] [New Brunswick–Dairy].
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3.

NEW BRUNSWICK–DAIRY

Te panel report for New Brunswick–Dairy expanded CFTA jurisprudence on
the concept of the “geographical component” to include a claim of indirect
discrimination in the context of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation.
At issue was a New Brunswick law (the Natural Products Act), neutral on its face,
which stated that the New Brunswick Farm Products Commission (NBFPC)
was not allowed to issue a licence for fuid milk distribution unless doing so was
“in the interest of general public or dairy products trade.”87 In New Brunswick–
Dairy, the NBFPC rejected a Nova Scotia dairy producer’s fuid milk licence
application.88 However, the panel ultimately held that in light of the “context
of the purpose” of the New Brunswick legislation, it did not believe that the
Act would be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.89 Specifcally, the panel
held that it was “extremely difcult for the Act to be applied in a manner that
is geographically neutral.”90 Te panel in New Brunswick–Dairy thus advanced
AIT (and thus CFTA) jurisprudence on indirect discrimination by clarifying
that the “geographic component” discussed in PEI–Dairy is a standard of
geographic neutrality.
Tough the panel creates the standard of “geographically neutral” to assess a
claim of indirect discrimination under the national treatment obligation, it leaves
the standard’s meaning ambiguous and uncertain. Does it mean that 50 per cent
of all licences should be given to provincial dairy producers, and the other 50 per
cent to out-of-province dairy producers? Or perhaps that licences are distributed
on a basis of the percentage of dairy producers headquartered in New Brunswick
relative to the rest of the country? Te panel in New Brunswick–Dairy improves
the analytical approach to an indirect discrimination claim, but it leaves the
contours of the new “geographically neutral” standard undefned.
4.

ONTARIO–DAIRY (I)

Te sixth panel report issued under the AIT, Ontario–Dairy (I), was the frst to
explicitly draw the links between the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation
and that of the WTO.91 Te panel provided that AIT article 401 “provides a
broad non-discrimination obligation akin to the national treatment obligation
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid at 1.
Ibid.
New Brunswick–Dairy, supra note 86 at 13.
Ibid [emphasis added].
See Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42.
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contained in a variety of international trade agreements such as the [WTO]
agreements.”92 Tough panels had long imported the language and concepts
from the domain of international trade law, this was the frst time that a panel
explicitly drew the link in the text of an opinion.
Tough the panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) explicitly links the AIT/CFTA’s
national treatment provision to its counterpart found inside of the GATT,
it proceeds to evaluate it on the basis of a standard that is not found within
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body jurisprudence under the GATT. Te panel
wrote that the impugned Ontario legislation “fail[ed] to provide to the producers
of these products from other provinces the best treatment it accords to producers
of dairy products in Ontario.”93 In GATT article III jurisprudence, the national
treatment obligation does not mandate that parties provide the “best treatment”
to that of other producers. Contrastingly, the standard of “best treatment” found
in both the text of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation, as well as
attendant jurisprudence, is a frm deviation from the explicit language of the
GATT article III which requires treatment that is “no less favourable.”94 CFTA
jurisprudence has yet to clarify if and how this diference in language between the
two national treatment obligations is meaningful.
A shortcoming in the panel’s analysis of the complainant’s national treatment
claim is in respect of its “like, directly competitive or substitutable” analysis.
Te faults in Ontario–Dairy (I)’s analysis on this particular issue pervades CFTA
national treatment jurisprudence and warrants greater attention by future
panels. At issue in the case were Ontario’s restrictions on the trade of dairy
analogs and dairy blends.95 Dairy analogs are imitation dairy products that are
actually vegetable based, while dairy blends are vegetable oil products that are
combined with any amount and any kind of milk ingredient to create a good that
resembles a dairy product.96 Te complainants in this case—Alberta and British
Columbia—alleged that Ontario measures discriminated against their “like,
directly competitive or substitutable” dairy analogs and dairy blend products and
gave better treatment to pure Ontario dairy products.97 In a defcient analysis, the
panel summarily concludes that the two sets of goods are “like.”98 At no point in
the opinion does the panel undertake any form of analysis or interpretation of the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Ibid at 18.
Ibid.
See GATT, supra note 14 at art III.
Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42 at 1.
Ibid at 1.
Ibid at 1-5.
Ibid at 18.
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phrase “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to determine whether or not
dairy analogs or blends were indeed sufciently similar to pure dairy products.
Tis difers substantially from WTO jurisprudence wherein the Appellate
Body has identifed a set of four factors that a panel must examine in order to
determine likeness.99 In a WTO likeness assessment, a panel must consider each
of the four following factors: (1) Physical characteristics, (2) Consumer tastes and
habits, (3) End uses, and (4) Tarif classifcation.100 Te WTO’s Appellate Body
has even ruled that a panel must examine the evidence relating to each of those
four criteria.101
Arguably, the respondent, Ontario, was deprived of informed reasoning
when the panel report that was issued did not contain a meaningful “likeness”
analysis. Not only does the panel provide scant justifcation in the instant case,
but it also leaves uncertain the requisite analysis for a conclusion of “likeness”
in a CFTA national treatment analysis. Without a factor-based test, the concern
arises that a determination of “likeness” will be the product of a panel’s subjective
intuition, rather than a fact-based analysis. Tis case was the frst instance in
which an AIT panel encountered two products that were sufciently diferent to
warrant a more searching analysis than had been conducted in the past.
5.

QUÉBEC–MARGARINE

Te panel in Québec–Margarine commits the same fault as the panel in Ontario–
Dairy (I) in undertaking an inadequate “likeness” analysis when conducting its
national treatment assessment.102 Moreover, some of the writing in the report
suggests that the panelists may have misread WTO case law. However, the panel
improved the AIT/CFTA jurisprudence on the identifcation of the “comparator”
class of goods in its national treatment test.
At issue in Québec–Margarine was a Quebec measure that required
out-of-province margarine producers to colour their product white, which
efectively made the margarine look similar to lard and less appetizing to the

99. European Communities–Measures Afecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos
(Complaint by Canada) (2001), WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R at para 101 (Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm>
[perma.cc/WXS8-UZ5C] [EC–Asbestos].
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid at para 109 [emphasis in original].
102. See Québec–Margarine, supra note 42.
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consumer than butter.103 It was argued that the measure was implemented to
protect the Quebec dairy industry and its sales of butter.104
Te panel provides an inadequate likeness analysis, just as the Ontario–Dairy
(I) panel had done. Te panel ofers little justifcation for its determination that
butter and margarine are “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to one
another. Te only rationale for a fnding of “likeness” provided in the opinion is
that because the impugned Quebec regulation repeatedly treats margarine as a
substitute for butter, it is thus in a “like” relationship with butter.105 None of the
four WTO factors are cited or used by the panel in its determination. It leaves a
reader, or respondent, unsatisfed as to the reasons provided for the conclusion
that the two products exist within a “like, directly competitive or substitutable”
relationship with one another. It does not meaningfully advance the case law or
the test for use by future panels, and it does not ofer much guidance to potential
future litigants.
In addition to the shortcomings of its likeness analysis, the panel also
misinterprets WTO case law on the GATT national treatment obligation (article
III). Te panel spends part of the report attempting to discern the proper test of
comparison as between the imported and domestic product. It provided that “[i]n
contrast to the formulation of GATT Article III, which deals with the treatment
accorded to imported products in comparison to ‘like domestic products,’” the
AIT predecessor to CFTA article 201(1) maintained that “the class of comparators
includes not only like goods but ‘directly competitive or substitutable goods.’”106
While the panel accurately writes that the CFTA test asks not merely whether the
products are “like” but also whether the two products are “directly competitive or
substitutable,” it incorrectly claims that the GATT article III test only employs
a “like” products test. As described in Part III(B), above, the GATT article III:4
national treatment provision indeed only asks the panel to determine whether the
imported and domestic product stand in a “like” relationship with one another.107
However, the GATT article III:2 national treatment provision imposes the exact
same test as the AIT/CFTA: Do the domestic and imported products exist in
either a “like” or “directly competitive or substitutable” relationship with one
another.108 It is true that GATT article III:2 applies to taxation measures and
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 25.
Ibid at 24.
GATT, supra note 14, art III:4, Annex I at para 2.
Ibid, art III:2.
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GATT article III:4 applies to non-taxation measures. Nonetheless, the “like,
directly competitive or substitutable” analysis of the products themselves can still
inform a CFTA national treatment analysis. Te panel’s unfortunate proclamation
on WTO case law obscures the fact that GATT article III, in part, does maintain
an identical test to that of the (former) AIT article 401(1).109 Québec–Margarine
erroneously suggests that a panel or complainant may not validly look to GATT
article III:2 case law to help determine whether two products are “like, directly
competitive or substitutable” in the course of a CFTA dispute.110
Despite the report’s analytical shortcomings, the panel does accurately
identify that the product comparison is not just whether the two products are
“like.” Rather, the drafters provided for a more expansive standard of comparison
in the national treatment analysis by providing the standard of “like, directly
competitive or substitutable.” Tough it remains unclear why AIT drafters and
CFTA re-negotiators opted for a broader version of the product comparison test,
the panel in this case clarifes for future panels that the nature of the language
meaningfully impacts the “like products” analysis in a national treatment claim.
6.

QUÉBEC–DAIRY

Te panel report in Québec–Dairy111 resurfaces the uncertainty caused by the
notion of “geographically neutral” measures in a national treatment analysis
that had frst been generated by PEI–Dairy and New Brunswick–Dairy.
At issue in Québec–Dairy was a facially-neutral measure that restricted the sale
of vegetable-based dairy alternatives as well as dairy blends.112 Te literal text of
the impugned Quebec measure did not suggest that imported products would
incur discriminatory treatment relative to domestic products.113 However, the
complainants claimed that the operation of the measure nonetheless discriminated
against imported products—namely dairy blends and dairy alternatives.114 Tus,
this was a case of alleged “indirect” discrimination. However, the panel’s analysis

109. See CFTA, supra note 11, art 201(1).
110. Québec–Margarine, supra note 42.
111. Report of Article 1703 Panel Regarding the Dispute between Saskatchewan and Québec
Concerning Dairy Blends, Dairy Analogues and Dairy Alternatives (21 March 2014),
online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/
DisputeResolution/PanelReports/PANEL%20REPORT%20-FINAL%20VERSION.pdf>
[perma.cc/WT73-RS7R] [Québec–Dairy].
112. Ibid at 4.
113. Ibid at 4-6.
114. Ibid at 6.
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as to whether the measure produced indirect discrimination in violation of the
AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation was severely lacking.
In its reasoning as to whether the Quebec measure indirectly discriminated
against imported “like, directly competitive or substitutable” products, the panel
in Québec–Dairy stated that it was “mindful” of the fndings in New Brunswick–
Dairy, wherein that earlier panel provided that there must be a “geographical
component” to a case of indirect discrimination.115 Notably, the panel in Québec–
Dairy did not explicitly note the new standard of “geographical neutrality” that
New Brunswick–Dairy had created.
In its fnding that the measure violated Quebec’s national treatment obligation
under the AIT, the panel failed to interpret the AIT in light of the facts of the
case at hand. Te panel report does not explain how the measure discriminates
against imported goods. Te panel merely provided that the prohibition of dairy
alternatives and dairy blends “discriminates in favour of [Quebec’s] domestic dairy
producers and processors.”116 It provided, at best, a circular argument rather than
substantive reasoning. If the complainant, Saskatchewan, and the respondent,
Quebec, both have producers of dairy products, as well as dairy blends and
alternatives, then how can the Quebec measure be said to unfairly discriminate
against imported products, when the measure necessarily discriminates against
domestic Quebec products as well? Te report does not provide enough
information for a reader to draw the conclusion that the panel did.
7.

ALBERTA–BEER MARK-UPS (APPEAL PANEL)

Te ffteenth and most recent dispute report issued under the AIT—the appeal
panel report from Artisan Ales’ complaint against Alberta’s beer measures—
substantially improves the case law on the national treatment obligation
under the CFTA.
One of its most important contributions to the CFTA case law is the appeal
panel’s criticism of the adequacy of the written reasons in the lower panel’s
decision. It disapproved of the lower panel’s report for “its fndings that were
perfunctory at best.”117 Te appeal panel wrote that “[t]he majority did not
interpret or analyze the Articles of the AIT that it found in its conclusions were
violated” by Alberta’s measures.118 Looking back to the lower panel’s report, this
is indeed the case. Firstly, the majority’s writing in the lower panel’s report was
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ibid at 16.
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See Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel), supra note 81 at para 63.
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a mere ten pages, while the preponderance of dispute panel reports have thus
far registered at nearly thirty pages. In respect of the alleged national treatment
violation, the full extent of the lower panel’s assessment was that the cited measures
were “inconsistent” with AIT article 401.119 Absolutely no reasoning is given for
the national treatment violation.120 Tough the panel report on this matter was
particularly lacking in its written fndings relative to the reports of all prior panels
up to that point, the appeal panel frmly pronounced the initial panel failed
to interpret or analyze the AIT articles. Tis analysis for CFTA articles moving
forward should help to improve the nature of the fndings of all panels. As this
article has thus far discussed, there have been many instances where panel reports
fail to expand on the reasons for their conclusions.
Another important contribution of this case to CFTA jurisprudence is
its reversal of the order of the national treatment test found in prior CFTA
jurisprudence. A determination of whether the measure discriminates against
imported products now comes after the test of whether the imported and domestic
products are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”121 Tis re-formulation
is now consistent with the national treatment test found in WTO jurisprudence
of GATT article III. By correcting the order, Alberta–Beer Mark-Ups (Appeal
Panel) has given greater legitimacy and authority to WTO national treatment
jurisprudence as it relates to the CFTA national treatment obligation.
In addition to re-ordering the CFTA national treatment test to align with
WTO national treatment case law, the adjudicators in Alberta–Beer Mark Ups
(Appeal Panel) also tethers the CFTA’s “no less favorable treatment” analysis
to GATT article III jurisprudence. In the body of its report, the appeal panel
provided for a fundamental underlying principle to the CFTA’s national treatment
obligation that is identical to that which is found in WTO national treatment
case law. In doing so, the appeal panel implicitly encourages CFTA panels to
consider the robust body of law on GATT article III. Te appeal panel stated
that an impugned Alberta measure provided less favorable treatment to imported
products as it “does not provide equality of competitive opportunities” as between
Alberta and out-of-province beer.122 Tis concept of “equality of competitive
conditions” as the core inquiry guiding a national treatment analysis is a bedrock
119. Report of Article 1716 Panel Regarding the Dispute between Artisan Ales Consulting Inc. and
Alberta regarding Beer Markups (28 July 2017) at 10, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat
<www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Decision-July-28-2017-Signed.pdf>
[perma.cc/8RUR-5GXR] [Alberta–Beer Mark Ups].
120. Ibid at 10.
121. Ibid at para 82.
122. Ibid at para 88.
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of WTO national treatment analysis under GATT article III.123 By linking the
essential exercise of a CFTA panel and the WTO panel in assessing a claim of
national treatment, future CFTA panels may more authoritatively draw upon
reasoning and conclusions from the domain of WTO jurisprudence.
Finally, the Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel) report provided the most
comprehensive analysis of a national treatment allegation to date. Te report clearly
demonstrated the connection between the measure at issue and the discrimination
that it produces so as to violate the CFTA’s national treatment obligation. For
the frst time, an AIT report does not leave a reader to make logical inferences
in order to arrive at the report’s conclusion. Te report carefully explains to the
reader the causal connection between Alberta’s provision of monetary grants
to domestic Albertan microbrewers and the consequential discrimination that
out-of-province microbrewers experienced in the Alberta marketplace.124 If taken
as a template, this appeal panel report will elevate the reasoning and clarity of
future CFTA reports in respect of the national treatment obligation.
E.

CONTINUED UNCERTAINTIES IN CFTA DOCTRINE AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS

Part III(C), above, explored the trajectory of CFTA jurisprudence concerning the
national treatment obligation, now found at CFTA article 201(1). Due respect
must be accorded to the work of the panellists—these individuals were tasked
with the job of identifying, interpreting, and implementing a foreign set of rules
and principles in a novel dispute forum. To date, Canada is the only country that
has created a trade agreement and dispute settlement body for domestic parties
to litigate internal trade barriers.
Tis investigation has identifed a number of shortcomings and uncertainties
generated by some of the fndings in these panel reports. Te most recent report
issued by the appeal panel from the Alberta–Beer Mark-Ups (Appeal Panel)
dispute did help to clarify a number of points in respect of the CFTA’s national
treatment obligation, as was discussed in Part III(C)(7), above. However, two key
elements of a CFTA panel’s national treatment analysis remain unresolved: the
requirements of a “like, directly competitive or substitutable” assessment at the
frst stage of the analysis, and the meaning of “geographic neutrality” in assessing
an indirect discrimination claim in the second stage of the analysis. Tis article
123. Japan–Alcoholic Beverages (II) (Complaint by the European Communities) (1996), WTO
Doc WT/DS8/AB/R at 16 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds8_e.htm> [perma.cc/STD3-8FFQ].
124. See Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel), supra note 81 at para 88.
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will now proceed to explore both the implications and possible remedies to these
two continued uncertainties.
1.

A CFTA “LIKE, DIRECTLY COMPETITIVE OR SUBSTITUTABLE” ANALYSIS

To date, no claim of a national treatment obligation violation has failed on the
“like, directly competitive or substitutable” stage of the analysis. However, the
extent and quality of the assessments at this stage have been modest throughout
CFTA jurisprudence. In some cases, AIT panels have simply asserted “likeness”
without any analysis whatsoever, such as in the case of Ontario–Dairy (I).125
In other cases, the panel may have reasoned why the imported and domestic
products are like, but the panel did not cite authority for the means or framework
by which it concluded likeness.126 Tat there is no consistent test applied in the
CFTA “likeness” analysis not only deprives the litigating parties of fulsome
reasoning, but it also makes it difcult for Canadian governments to create
CFTA-compliant laws and regulations.
Despite the parallels between the CFTA and GATT national treatment
obligations, in no case has an AIT/CFTA presiding body cited the four factors
routinely employed by WTO panels to ascertain likeness. Tese four factors,
concisely re-expressed in EC–Asbestos, are: (1) Physical characteristics, (2)
Consumer preferences, (3) End uses, and (4) Tarif classifcation.127 In GATT
jurisprudence, these factors are requisite elements of a likeness examination.128
No one factor is decisive.129 It is this approach that CFTA panels should adopt in
the course of the frst stage of a national treatment analysis.
In certain cases, the two products at issue were literally the same. For
example, in New Brunswick–Dairy, the discrimination was in respect of Nova
Scotia fuid milk products which were treated less favorably than New Brunswick
fuid milk products. An implementation of the EC–Asbestos four-factor test could
not have resulted in any fnding other than that the imported and domestic
products were “like.” However, in Québec–Margarine, the two products were not
the same: Domestic Quebec butter received more favourable treatment than the
foreign Alberta margarine. Te four-factor analysis from EC–Asbestos suggests
that the Québec–Margarine panel’s determination that butter and margarine were
“like” was not necessarily obvious. Margarine and butter have diferent tarif
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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classifcations: their end-uses can difer, consumer preferences may not be the
same, and physical characteristics are not necessarily similar either. A panel that
considers and weighs each factor must think through its reasoning for a fnding
of likeness, which may elevate the quality of the panel’s decision making. And
a standard set of “likeness” factors would also bring consistency and coherence
to the frst stage of the national treatment analysis. Te WTO’s four-factor
test, which has been repeatedly used in GATT adjudication, could serve as that
framework. Finally, a comprehensive framework would give greater guidance to
Canadian governments hoping to craft measures that are consistent with their
CFTA national treatment obligations.
2.

STAGE TWO “INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION” ANALYSIS

A more complex uncertainty that remains unresolved in CFTA jurisprudence is
the precise nature of the “indirect discrimination” analysis. Specifcally, CFTA
case law has identifed that in order to remain in compliance with the national
treatment obligation, the impact of a government’s measure on trade in goods
must abide by a standard of “geographic neutrality.”130 Tough this is an important
development, the contours of the “geographically neutral” requirement remain
obscure in CFTA national treatment jurisprudence.
Tere are many ways in which the phrase “geographic neutrality” can be
interpreted, each of which can have a diferent impact on the conclusion of
a national treatment analysis. Does “geographically neutral” mean that, for
example, where a measure implemented by Province X requires that licences be
held by producers of a particular good, the licences should be divided equally
to every province and territory? But what if, just prior to the enactment of the
measure, Province X had ten-times more producers of that good than Province
Y? On a conceptual level, geographic neutrality makes sense in the context of
national treatment obligations: A measure should not produce an efect that
harms out-of-province producers more than domestic provincial producers, all
things being equal. However, it can be a signifcant challenge to isolate and assess
the trade fow efect of a legislative or regulatory measure on its own. A look
towards the WTO’s approach to an indirect discrimination analysis may help
guide future CFTA panels on the issue of “geographic neutrality.”
Te WTO’s dispute settlement body has identifed two relevant means of
testing for indirect discrimination. Te Appellate Body in EC–Seal Products
frmly established the “disparate impact” test as one way to undertake an article
130. See New Brunswick–Dairy, supra note 86 at 13.
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III national treatment analysis.131 In GATT jurisprudence, a measure inficts
“disparate impact” on imported and domestic goods when it hurts the competitive
opportunities of imported goods relative to those of domestic goods.132 Indeed,
international trade scholars have suggested that the efects of a measure wield great
importance in determining whether it will be deemed to accord protectionism.133
In addition to an “efects” analysis, a WTO panel also looks to the “design,
structure, and expected operation of the measure at issue.”134 Tough the efect
of a measure can be important in determining whether it accords “less favorable
treatment” to imported “like, directly competitive or substitutable” goods, the
WTO’s Appellate Body has provided that a fnding of discrimination need not
be based on the actual efects of the measure.135
Tus, drawing on WTO jurisprudence, a CFTA panel has at least two means
to identify a measure that facilitates indirect discrimination: an “efects” test,
and a “design and structure” test. Indeed, in at least one instance, an AIT panel
did not consider an impugned measure’s efects, and instead employed a version
of this latter “design, structure and expected operation” test to identify indirect
discrimination.136 Rather than examine the efects of the measure, the panel held
that the challenged measure’s wording “makes it extremely difcult for the Act
to be applied in a manner that is geographically neutral” and thus remain in
compliance with the CFTA’s national treatment obligation.137
Unfortunately, CFTA jurisprudence has thus far systemically implemented
the “efects test” in a manner that generates concern for, and uncertainty about,
the CFTA’s national treatment case law. Te CFTA dispute panel reports
released have not adequately explained or justifed why the measures were not
geographically neutral, which is a necessary intermediate conclusion to their
131. See Julia Y Qin, “Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives Under WTO Law: Refections
on EC—Seal Products” (2014-15) 108 AJIL Unbound 308.
132. Joost Pauwelyn, “Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt
the WTO” (2004) 15 Eur J Intl L 575 at 582.
133. See generally Ming Du, supra note 50 at 155; Gâlea & Biriş, supra note 38 at 177.
134. Tailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Complaint by
the Philippines) (2011), WTO Doc WT/DS371/AB/R at para 134 (Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds371_e.htm>
[perma.cc/X2AQ-6J7B].
135. United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (Complaint by the European
Communities) (2002), WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/RW at para 215 (Appellate Body Report),
online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm> [perma.cc/
NC7V-4KYW] [US–FSC].
136. New Brunswick–Dairy, supra note 86 at 13.
137. Ibid.
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ultimate fndings that the measure produced indirect discrimination. Te case of
Ontario–Dairy (I) can help illustrate this common analytical shortcoming that
appears throughout CFTA jurisprudence.
Te panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) concluded that the Ontario measure had
the efect of discriminating against vegetable-oil based dairy alternatives or dairy
blends.138 However, without ever establishing why discrimination against dairy
alternatives and blends was not “geographically neutral,” the panel concluded
that the measure indirectly discriminated against foreign goods and thereby
violated the national treatment obligation.139 Because the Ontario measure was
neutral on its face, for the panel’s conclusion to logically follow, the reader of
the report is forced to assume that there are very few, if any, producers of dairy
blends or dairy alternatives in Ontario. Tus, by discriminating against such
products, Ontario was primarily discriminating against “like” foreign products
(i.e., dairy blends and dairy alternatives). However, the panel report does not
provide for this necessary logical link in the body of the report. If 99 per cent
of all Canadian producers of dairy alternatives or dairy blends were based out of
Ontario, would an Ontario policy discriminating against dairy alternatives or
dairy blends have violated the CFTA’s national treatment clause? Te failure of
the panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) to establish the lacking “geographic neutrality”
of an indirectly discriminatory measure—an essential conclusion for a fnding of
national treatment violation—is a consistent feature of CFTA national treatment
jurisprudence. A measure may validly discriminate against a “like” product and
remain consistent with the CFTA’s national treatment obligation. It is only those
discriminatory measures that fail to remain “geographically neutral” that cause a
violation of the agreement.
Tere need not be a numerical threshold to surpass for a panel to reach
a conclusion as to whether the policy is geographically neutral. Moreover, the
WTO has not created a numerical “test” for a measure to satisfy that would allow
it to deem that the disparate impact has reached discriminatory levels. However,
the WTO’s Appellate Body requires a panel to undertake “careful analysis of
the contested measure and of its implications in the marketplace” to justifably
establish a fnding that a party violated its national treatment obligation.140
Carefully constructed reasoning that shows how the CFTA panel arrived at
its conclusion that the measure not only discriminated against a particular
product, but that the discriminated product was chiefy an import relative to its
138. Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42 at 18.
139. Ibid at 17-18.
140. US–FSC, supra note 136 at para 215.
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better-treated domestic counterpart, is a necessary part of a conclusion of indirect
discrimination.
Tis article does not advance the argument that CFTA panels should
create a bright line test to determine whether or not a measure satisfes a test of
geographical neutrality. Instead, this article argues that a panel should be required
to make explicit its reasoning so that the justifcation is clear and transparent,
so that over time the CFTA national treatment jurisprudence may ofer a fair and
consistent approach and provide future disputants greater predictability.

IV. CONCLUSION
Largely untouched for over twenty-fve years, the collective jurisprudence of
the CFTA is ripe for analysis and constructive criticism by the legal academic
community. Tis is especially true with the CFTA’s dispute forum taking on
heightened importance as a result of the Court’s 2018 ruling in R v Comeau,
wherein the Court efectively ruled that it would not strike down non-tarif
measures notwithstanding their detrimental efects on internal trade. Tis article
aims to spark a scholarly dialogue on the contents of domestic trade dispute
rulings, and to that end, focuses on the jurisprudence of one obligation under the
agreement in particular: Te national treatment requirement.
Te contours of the national treatment obligation under the CFTA have
gained greater coherence over the AIT’s lifetime. Te most recent case, Alberta–
Beer Markups, provided much needed clarity and analytical rigour to the national
treatment analysis. Tough Alberta–Beer Markups improved the state of national
treatment jurisprudence, it left unresolved the means to answer two key questions.
First, when are two products “like, directly competitive and substitutable” in the
context of the CFTA? Second, when is an indirectly discriminatory measure
“geographically neutral”? To fll these analytical gaps, this article advanced
proposals that drew from GATT jurisprudence.
Opaque internal trade obligations make it difcult for policy makers to craft
measures that comply with the strictures of the CFTA. In addition, domestic
commercial actors who encounter trade barriers may aver from engaging with
the CFTA’s dispute resolution process if the jurisprudential uncertainty weighs
against the cost of litigation. Neither of these outcomes helps bring to bear the
economic unity that the nation’s internal trade agreement regime was meant to
improve in the frst place.

